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TAKING THE PUBLIC OUT OF
DETERMINING GOVERNMENT POLICY:
THE NEED FOR AN APPROPRIATE SCOPE
OF BARGAINING TEST IN THE ILLINOIS
PUBLIC SECTOR
INTRODUCTION

The Hartford School District (Hartford) is an Illinois school
district that is having financial trouble.1 Hartford's population is
declining and so is the average class room size in its school system. In response to this decline in the student body, the Hartford
community voted to reduce its educational budget. To implement
this reduction, Hartford decided to decrease the number of its
teaching staff through a reduction in force (RIF). Although this
choice was difficult, Hartford carefully made the decision through
the political process and the community feels it is the logical decision under the circumstances.2
The Hartford teachers union (Union), representing a collective bargaining unit3 under the Illinois Education Labor Relations Act (IELRA),4 did not react favorably to the RIF decision.
Although Hartford cannot financially maintain its current teaching staff, the Union decided to file an "unfair labor practice" claim
with the Illinois Education Labor Relations Board (IELRB).5 Un-

1. The illustrative budgetary dilemma of the Hartford School District is fictitious. The Hartford School District represents the many public sector employers in
Illinois who annually face budget concerns. This Note focuses on educational employers; however, the discussions and conclusions are equally applicable to all
Illinois public sector employers.
2. Budget concerns over the allocation of public funds are common concerns.
The public's recent dissatisfaction with local government stems from the view that
government is "pursuing internal goals instead of solving the problem of the customer." Charles C. Mulcahy & Marion E. Mulcahy, Innovation is the Key to a Redesigned and Cost Effective Local Government, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 549, 549 (1995).
This Note addresses this dissatisfaction by focusing on the problems with collective
bargaining in the Illinois public sector.
3. 115 ILCS 5/2(m) (1993). Bargaining unit is defined as "any group of employees for which an exclusive representative is selected." Id.
4. See infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the design
and creation of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (IELRA) and the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA).
5. See infra note 43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the procedures
under the IELRA for filing an unfair labor practice claim.
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der the current Illinois system, the Union can effectively demand,
and receive, an opportunity to force bargaining over the RIF order
and effectively usurp the public's decision.6
Determining which types of employment decisions are subject
to mandatory bargaining is a recurring issue in the Illinois public
employment sector.7 The center of this problem focuses on the
inherent contradiction between two identical sections which appear in both of the Illinois acts that govern public sector bargaining.' These two sections attempt to define the scope of topics
which are subject to mandatory bargaining.9 The interpretation
and development of a test to reconcile these two scope of bargaining sections has caused considerable debate.'°
Prior to 1992, each of the three Illinois public labor relations
boards had similar methods for determining whether a subject
was mandatorily bargainable. 11 However, in 1992, the Illinois
Supreme Court promulgated a new three-part test for the Illinois
public labor boards to use when determining whether a subject is
mandatorily bargainable. 12 By setting forth this test in Central

6. See infra notes 142-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems with the current Illinois scope of bargaining test.
7. Jill D. Leka, Survey of Illinois Law: Employment Law, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J.
823, 829 (1993).
8. Central City Educ. Ass'n, IEA/NEA v. IELRB, 599 N.E.2d 892, 900 (Ill.
1992).
9. See 5 ILCS 315/4, 315/7 (1993) (setting forth employers' and employees'
rights with respect to their duty to bargain under the IPLRA); see also 115 ILCS
5/4, 5/10 (1993) (setting forth employers' and employees' rights with respect to
their duty to bargain under the IELRA).
10. See, e.g., Central City, 599 N.E.2d at 898 (discussing the dilemma of interpreting the IELRA); see also Michael Jenkins, Collective Bargaining for Public
Employees: An Overview of Illinois' New Act, 1983 S. ILL. U. L.J. 483, 490 (discussing the problems that the IPLRA will pose with regard to the scope of bargaining).
11. See, e.g., Decatur Sch. Dist. No. 61, 4 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) 9 1076,
315, 319 (IELRB 1988) (adopting a scope of bargaining test which initially weighed
the two parts in section 4 of the IELRA and then weighed the benefits against the
burdens of determining if a subject is mandatorily bargainable), affd sub. nom.,
Decatur Board of Educ., Dist. No. 61 v. IELRB, 536 N.E.2d 743, 746 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989); Cermak Health Services, 3 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) 9 3030, 156, 161
(ILLRB 1987) (citing Beloit Educ. Ass'n v. W.E.R.C., 242 N.W.2d 231 (Wis. 1976)
and Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 337 A.2d
262 (Pa. 1975) in applying a test which balances the impact on employees' wages,
hours and terms and conditions of employment against the extent to which negotiations would interfere with officials' formulation or management of public policy);
American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees, 5 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill.
(LRP) $ 2001, 1, 3-5 (ISLRB 1988) (adopting the application of a balancing test
which determined that corrections department's interest in drug testing outweighed employees' interest in bargaining over whether bargaining would occur),
affd sub. nom., American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. ISLRB,
546 N.E.2d 687 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
12. See infra note 125 for a statement of the Central City test.
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City Educational Ass'n v. IELRB,'3 the Illinois Supreme Court
deviated from prior public labor board methods and the mandates
of the two Illinois public labor acts themselves.' 4 Although the Illinois legislature enacted the two Illinois public sector acts to
cover public employees," the court in Central City essentially
adopted a private sector test. 16 Furthermore, the Central City
court failed to appraise and accommodate for the unique economic
of public sector bargaining when it
and political characteristics
17
created the test.
This Note examines the differences between labor relations in
the public sector and the private sector and focuses on the problem posed by the Central City decision. Part I of this Note looks at
Illinois public sector bargaining procedure and gives a history of
Illinois public labor cases dealing with the issue of what is subject
to mandatory bargaining. Part II closely examines the Central
City decision and discusses its ramifications. Part III of this Note
examines why the Central City court erroneously justified the
adoption of its scope of bargaining test by relying on private sector and Pennsylvania precedent. Finally, Part IV of this Note

13. 599 N.E.2d 892 (Ill. 1992).
14. See supra note 11 and accompanying text for discussion of the tests used by
the IELRB, ILLRB and ISLRB in determining the scope of bargaining in the Illinois public sector.
15. See 5 ILCS 315/1 (1993) (stating that the purpose of the IPLRA is to regulate labor relations between Illinois public employers and employees); see also 115
ILCS 5/1 (1993) (stating that the purpose of the IELRA is to promote orderly and
constructive relationships between Illinois educational employees and their employers).
16. See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964). In
Fibreboard,the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an employer's economically motivated decision to replace some of its employees with those of an
independent contractor was subject to mandatory bargaining. Id. at 205. In, citing
NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952), the Court looked to industrial bargaining practices in assessing the appropriateness of including a subject
within the scope of bargaining. Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 211. The Court held that
this "industrial experience" reflects the interests of labor and management and is
"indicative of the amenability of such subjects to the collective bargaining process."
Id. Looking to this analysis, the Court held that the employer's decision to replace
his employees was a mandatory subject of bargaining. Id. at 212. See also First
Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 666 (1981). In First Nat'l Maintenance,
the Court addressed the issue of whether an employer was required to bargain
about the effect of its decision to terminate a contract with one of its customers for
economic reasons. Id. In holding that the employer had no duty to bargain with the
union regarding the decision itself, the Court clarified the Fibreboard analysis in
promulgating a benefits/burdens test to determine the scope of bargaining under
the NLRA. Id. at 677-79. This test specifically weighs the benefits that bargaining
would produce over the specified subject against the burdens that bargaining puts
on management. Id.
17. See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unique
political and economic characteristics involved in public sector bargaining.
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discusses how other jurisdictions define the scope of bargaining in
the public sector, and proposes a revised test for the Illinois Supreme Court to adopt which gives necessary weight to the unique
economic and political characteristics of public sector bargaining.
I. THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING IN THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC
SECTOR MODEL

A problem exists in determining what matters are subject to
mandatory bargaining under the Illinois public labor acts. The
development of a test designed to resolve this scope of bargaining
problem should incorporate the unique aspects of public sector
bargaining. This Part discusses the history of the Illinois public
labor acts, and describes how the Illinois courts have interpreted
the acts to define the scope of bargaining.
A. Legislative History of Public Labor Law in Illinois

The enactment of the Illinois public labor acts was the first
comprehensive statutory regulation of public sector collective
bargaining in Illinois history.'" The Illinois General Assembly
used the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),' 9 which governs
private sector bargaining, and the Pennsylvania Public Employee
Relations Act 20 as models for its public sector labor acts. 2' Both
of the Illinois public labor acts provoked extensive debate in the
House and Senate, each act passing only after the Governor's
amendatory veto.22 The result of the Governor's amendatory veto

18. Martin H. Malin, Implementing the Illinois Educational Labor Relations
Act, 61 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 101, 101 (1985); see also Developments in the Law Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1679 (1984) [hereinafter Develop-

ments]. Relatively speaking, the Illinois enactment of public sector labor legislation
was late compared to other states. By 1984, most states had adopted some form of
public labor statutory bargaining legislation. Id.
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 103-321 (1992).
20. See Decatur Bd. of Educ., Dist. No. 61 v. IELRB, 536 N.E.2d 743, 745 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989) (noting that Illinois used Pennsylvania's public labor act as a model); see also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.201 (1988). The Pennsylvania statute is
very similar to the Illinois acts. Decatur, 536 N.E.2d at 746. However, the Pennsylvania statute only entitles employees to "meet and discuss" with the public employer about employment conditions while the Illinois statute requires collective bargaining. Id. at 747. Under this "meet and discuss" standard the employer merely
has to listen to the employees' grievances and take them into consideration. Id.
Pennsylvania defines "meet and discuss" as "the obligation of a public employer
upon request to meet at reasonable times and discuss recommendations submitted
by representatives of public employees: provided that any decisions or determinations on matters so discusses shall remain with the public employer and be deemed
final issue or issues raised." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(17) (1988) (emphasis added).
21. Malin,supra note 18, at 101.
22. See ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9(b); Malin, supra note 18, at 101. In Illinois, the
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was that the two Illinois public sector labor acts have many identical provisions.2" Although the three separate public sector labor
boards are instructed to merely interpret each others' decisions as
persuasive authority,24 the existence of identical wording in both
of the Illinois labor acts and the close timing of their passage
creates a pari materia effect concerning the scope of bargaining.25
The implementation of these acts produced an immediate
impact on the scope of collective bargaining in Illinois. 26 However, the implementation of these acts was only half the battle;
finding an effective way to interpret the acts is where the real
controversies arose.

governor may veto a bill in its entirety through his veto powers. Malin, supra note
18, at 101 n.4. However, the legislature may override this veto by a three-fifths
vote in each house. Id. This veto power, termed an "amendatory veto," mandates
that the governor return the bill to the house of origination with recommendations
for specific change. Id. If each house accepts the change by majority vote, the governor may certify that the acceptance conforms to the recommendations and allow
the bill to become law. Id.
23. In his amendatory veto, Governor Thompson provided:
House Bill 1530 provides for a system of collective bargaining for the educational employees of Illinois. As this fundamental right was granted to all
private sector employees more than a half century ago, I deem it appropriate
to extend that right to educational employees. However, I believe that several changes need to be made in the legislation to create a workable and fair
system that balances the rights of educational employees with the unique
managerial problems that beset educational employers and the taxpayers
who ultimately pay the bill.
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HOUSE BILL 1530, 83d Cong. Ill.,
9134, 9135 (Oct. 5, 1983). The IPLRA was passed before the IELRA. Therefore, in
an effort to hasten the IELRA's implementation, Governor Thompson proposed
that many of the same sections of the IPLRA be implemented into the IELRA. Id.
The IELRA passed relatively easily after Governor Thompson made these changes
in his amendatory veto. See H.R. CONG. REC. Ill. 83d 105 (Oct. 19, 1983) (as codified in 115 ILCS 5/1-27 (1993)) (accepting Governor Thompson's recommendations
for the changes regarding House Bill 1530 by an 86 to 26 vote).
24. See 5 ILCS 315/27 (1993) (stating that other labor boards' decisions are persuasive, but not binding under the IPLRA); see also 115 ILCS 5/17.1 (1993) (stating
that other labor boards decisions are persuasive, but not binding under the
IELRA).
25. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979) (defining statutes in pari
materia as "those relating to the same person or thing or having a common purpose"); see also Stephen H. Sutro, Interpretationof Initiatives by Reference to Similar Statutes: Cannons of Construction do not Adequately Measure Voter Intent, 34
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 945, 949 (1994). As Sutro discusses, this type of statutory
interpretation stems from the theory that "when [a] legislature enact[s] statutes on
the same topic, it most likely intended that they be consistent with each other. ..."
Id. Although the IPLRA and IELRA are distinguishable as to whom they cover, the
IELRB, ISLRB and ILLRB utilize the Central City test when making scope of bargaining decisions. See infra note 141 and accompanying text discussing IELRB,
ISLRB and ILLRB decisions which have adopted the Central City test.
26. Malin, supra note 18, at 102.
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B. The Public Labor Model in Illinois as it Relates to the Scope of
BargainingDilemma
Three agencies govern collective bargaining in the Illinois
public sector. 27 Two separate acts provide the agencies with their
29
2
authoritative power. ' The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act
(IPLRA) governs most of the public sector through the Illinois
State Labor Relations Board 30 (ISLRB) and the Illinois Local Labor Relations Board 3 1 (ILLRB).3 2 The IELRA3 3 regulates
collective bargaining in public education through the IELRB.34
In drafting the IPLRA and the IELRA, the Illinois legislature
looked to the NLRA and the public sector collective bargaining
statutes of other jurisdictions as models. 35 However, the IPLRA
and the IELRA differ from the NLRA in a number of ways.36
One of the more significant differences is that the Illinois acts
include sections which delineate employers' rights as they relate
the NLRA is silent on the subject of employers'
to bargaining;
37
rights.
A central issue which these boards frequently debate is
whether management may unilaterally implement a change without subjecting that change to mandatory bargaining. 8 In addition to interpreting their respective acts, the ILLRB, ISLRB and

27. Martin H. Malin,Public Employees' Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 313, 336 (1993) [hereinafter Right to Strike].
28. Id.
29. 5 ILCS 315/1-27 (1993).
30. See 5 ILCS 315/5(a) (stating that the ISLRB has jurisdiction over "collective
bargaining matters between employee organizations and the State of Illinois, excluding the General Assembly of the State of Illinois, between organizations and
units of local government and school districts with a population not in excess of
one million persons, and between employee organizations and the Regional Transportation Authority").
31. See 5 ILCS 315/5(b) (stating that the ILLRB has jurisdiction over "collective
bargaining agreement matters between employee organizations and units of local
government with a population in excess of one million persons, but excluding the
Regional Transportation Authority").
32. Right to Strike, supra note 27, at 336.
33. 115 ILCS 5/1-21 (1993).
34. 115 ILCS 5/5; Right to Strike, supra note 27, at 336.
35. Malin, supra note 18, at 101.
36. See, e.g., id. (citing differences in the IELRA, including a different definition
of supervisors and managerial employees who are excluded from coverage and
stipulation of procedures for employers to voluntary recognize employee organizations).
37. Id. Compare 5 ILCS 315/4 (stating employer rights with respect to their
duty to bargain under the IPLRA) and 115 ILCS 5/10 (stating employer rights with
respect to their duty to bargain under the IELRA) with 29 U.S.C. §§ 103-321 (1988)
(failing to recognize employer rights in the private sector).
38. Leka, supra note 7, at 834.
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IELRB also look to the National Labor Relations Board3 9 (NLRB)
and each other's decisions for precedent.4 ° Scope of bargaining
problems arise when management desires to make a change, and
a group of affected employees, who are organized in a collective
bargaining unit,41 want a say in that change.42 If management
and the union representing the affected employees cannot agree
upon whether the union has a right to bargain about a proposed
change, the union may file an "unfair labor practice"' claim with
one of the labor boards."
Initially, the labor boards respond to these grievances by
having a hearing officer examine the circumstances and determine
if collective bargaining is necessary.45 If the officer determines

39. 29 U.S.C. § 153. The NLRB is the governing body which hears and decides
controversies under the NLRA. Id.
40. Leka, supra note 7, at 833-34. The Illinois legislature provides that, unless
contradicted by administrative precedent previously established by the IELRB,
ILLRB or the ISLRB, all final decisions and unfair labor practice cases decided by
each separate board, may be considered, but need not be followed by the other
boards. Id.
41. See 5 ILCS 315/9 (stating procedure on how to receive recognition as a collective bargaining unit under the IPLRA); 115 ILCS 5/7 (stating procedure on how
to receive recognition as a collective bargaining unit under the IELRB). See also
Malin, supra note 18, at 107 (discussing how public employees covered under the
IELRA may organize and be recognized as a bargaining unit); Jenkins, supra note
10, at 487 (discussing how public employees covered under the IPLRA may organize and be recognized as a bargaining unit).
42. See 5 ILCS 315/7 (setting forth the duty to bargain under the IPLRA); see
also 115 ILCS 5/10 (setting forth the duty to bargain under the IELRA).
43. The IELRA provides:
Unfair labor practices. (a) Educational employers, their agents or representatives are prohibited from:
(1) Interfering, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed under this Act....
(5) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with an employee representative which is the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate
unit, including but not limited to the discussing of grievances with the exclusive representative; provided, however, that if an alleged unfair labor
practice involves interpretation or application of the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement and said agreement contains a grievance and arbitration procedure, the Board may defer the resolution of such dispute to the
grievance and arbitration procedure contained in said agreement....
115 ILCS 5/14. See also 5 ILCS 315/10 (setting forth unfair labor practices as they
pertain to the IPLRA). Both the IELRA and the IPLRA set forth a number of other
"unfair labor practices," including, interfering with the formation of an employee
organization, discriminating against members of any employee organization, violating election regulations, refusing to comply with provisions of a binding arbitration
award and the misuse of public funds in representation elections. Id.; 115 ILCS
5/14.
44. See 5 ILCS 315/5(a), (b) (setting forth the powers of the ISLRB under section (a) and the powers of the ILLRB under section (b)); see also 115 ILCS 5/5
(setting forth the powers of the IELRB).
45. 115 ILCS 5/15(i); 5 ILCS 315/5(j). Under the IPLRA and the IELRA the
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that the proposed change is subject to mandatory bargaining,
management must bargain in good faith over the change with an
employee representative.4 6 Once the parties settle their differences on the proposed change, they must execute a written contract,
commonly referred to as a "collective bargaining agreement,"4
which incorporates any agreement reached between the two parties. 48 However, if the hearing officer determines that the proposed change is only a permissive49 subject, management may

boards may adopt, promulgate, amend or rescind rules and regulations in accordance with the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act as they deem necessary to
carry out the scope of their respective acts. Id. Each of the Board's have created
rules which allow for initial findings by a hearing officer. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit.
80(c), § 1200.40 (1994) (setting forth the authority of an administrative law judge
under the ISLRB and the ILLRB, including the authority to "render and serve the
recommended decision and order on the parties to the proceeding"); see also ILL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 80(c), § 1105.80 (1994) (setting forth the authority of a hearing
officer to issue a decision and give reasons for that decision under the IELRA).
46. See, e.g., Kewanee Educ. Ass'n, IEA-NEA, 4 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP)
1136, 549, 552 (IELRB 1988). In Kewanee, the IELRB defined "good faith" as follows:
Good faith requires a state of mind which is conducive to reaching an agreement.... Good faith bargaining requires more than going through the motions of bargaining and the making of counterproposals since one may comply with all these formalities with a mind completely closed and with no
intention or desire to reach an agreement.
Id. The IELRB looks to the totality of the circumstances and makes the determination whether the party at issue had a predetermination not to reach an agreement.
Id. at 553. In Kewanee, the IELRB held that since the school district made a final
offer early in negotiations refusing to budge and responding to the issues raised by
the union by rejecting them "out of hand without any explanation or without offering counterproposals," the school district was not bargaining in good faith. Id.
47. Black's Law Dictionary defines a collective bargaining agreement as:
[An] [aigreement between an employer and a labor union which regulates
terms and conditions of employment. The joint and several contract of members of union made by officers of union as their agents. Such is enforceable
by and against union in matters which affect all members alike or large
classes of members, particularly those who are employees of other party to
contract.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 239 (5th ed. 1979)
48. See 5 ILCS 315/7; 115 ILCS 5/10 (defining the duty to bargain under the
IPLRA and the IELRA).
49. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of the Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 344
(1958) (adopting the terms mandatory, permissive and illegal or prohibited for
classifying subjects of bargaining). The public sector has adopted the terms "mandatory," "permissive" and "prohibitive" from the private sector. Jane Wandel Nelson, Comment, State Court Interpretationof Teacher Collective Bargaining Statutes: Four Approaches to the Scope of BargainingIssue, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 421, 425
(1977). When a subject of bargaining is deemed "permissive," employers may unilaterally act without incurring unfair labor practice charges. Id. at 426. The Illinois
labor relations boards have adopted the term "permissive" to have the same meaning in Illinois. See, e.g., Mt. Vernon Educ. Ass'n, 10 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP)
$ 1058, 234, 236 (IELRB 1994) (holding that the right to bargain is a statutory
right that, if waived, is a "permissive" subject of bargaining).
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implement its proposed change without bargaining with employee
representatives. 0
If management or the union disagrees with the hearing
officer's decision, they are permitted to appeal to one of the labor
boards."' Then, much like a district court to a magistrate, the
board reviews the facts of the case and writes its own decision
regarding the hearing officer's decision. 2 If either of the parties
do not agree with the respective board's decision, they may then
appeal to the Appellate Court presiding over the district in which
the board sits.53 From the appellate level, the respective parties
may appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. 4 The reviewing courts
give considerable deference to the boards' decisions pertaining to
the scope of bargaining because of each board's recognized expertise in its respective field. 5
A commonly litigated issue under both of the Illinois labor
acts arises when determining which types of employment deci-

50. Mount Vernon, 10 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) $ 1058, at 239.
51. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 80(c), § 1220.60 (setting forth procedural review of
administrative law judge's decision under the IPLRA including limit to file an
exception to administrative law judge's decision); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 80(c), §
1105.80 (setting forth procedural review of hearing officer's decision under the
IELRA including 14 day limit to file exception to hearing officer's decision).
52. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 80(c), § 1220.60 (discussing procedural review
under the IPLRA); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 80(c), § 1105.80 (discussing procedural review under the IELRA).
53. The IELRA addresses judicial review in Section 16, which provides:
Judicial review. (a) A charging party or any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought
may apply for and obtain judicial review of an order of the Board entered
under this Act in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Review Law, as now or hereafter amended, except that such judicial review
shall be taken directly to the Appellate Court of a judicial district in which
the Board maintains an office....
115 ILCS 5/16. See 5 ILCS 315/1-27 (allowing appeal to the Appellate Court in
which the aggrieved party resides or transacts business).
54. See 735 ILCS 5/3-101 (1993) (setting forth procedure for administrative
review in Illinois).
55. See, e.g., County of Cook v. ILLRB, 639 N.E.2d 187, 190 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
(conceding deference to the ILLRB in interpretation of the IELRA); Village of Franklin Park v. ISLRB, 638 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (conceding deference to the ISLRB in interpretation of the IPLRA); Decatur Bd. of Educ. Dist. No.
61 v. IELRB, 536 N.E.2d 743, 746 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (conceding deference to the
IELRB in interpretation of the IELRA). The reviewing courts of Illinois adopted
this "considerable deference" standard from a private sector case relating to the
NLRB's decisions. Decatur, 536 N.E.2d at 746 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441
U.S. 488, 494 (1979)). Illinois courts have recognized the need to defer to an administrative board's decisions under its respective acts. Id. If a court did not adhere to
this principle it would be "substitut[ing] [its] general knowledge and study for the
expertise required of [the] Board members by [the respective act setting forth the
power of the board]." Id.
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sions are subject to mandatory bargaining. 6 The RIF hypothetical at the introduction of this Note is an excellent example of this
type of decision. These types of problems revolve around the interpretation of two sections included in both the IELRA and the
IPLRA.57 For simplicity, this Note will use the IELRA's section
numbering.
Section 10(a) of the IELRA sets forth the extent and limits of
mandatory bargaining under the Act. Section 10(a) provides:
Duty to bargain. (a) An educational employer and the exclusive representative 8 have the authority and the duty to bargain
collectively as set forth in this Section. Collective bargaining is the
performance of the mutual obligations of the educational employer
and the representative of the educational employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment, and to execute

a written contract incorporating any agreement reached by such
obligation, provided such obligation does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.59
However, Section 4 of the IELRA limits the duty to bargain
provided for in Section 10(a).6 ° Section 4 of the IELRA provides:
Employer rights. Employers shall not be required to bargain
over matters of inherent managerial policy, which shall include
such areas of discretion or policy as the functions of the employer,
standards of services, its overall budget, the organizationalstructure
and selection of new employees and direction of employees. Employ-

ers, however, shall be required to bargain collectively with regard to
policy matters directly affecting wages, hours and terms and condi-

tions of employment as well as the impact thereon upon request by
employee representatives. To preserve the rights of employers and
exclusive representatives which have established collective bargaining relationships or negotiated collective bargaining agreements
prior to the effective date of this Act, employers shall be required to
bargain collectively with regard to any matter concerning wages,
hours or conditions of employment about which they have bargained
for and agreed to in a collective
bargaining agreement prior to the
61
effective date of this Act.

56. Leka, supra note 7, at 835.
57. See generally Central City Educ. Ass'n IEA-NEA v. IELRB, 599 N.E.2d 892,
898 (Ill. 1992) (noting the difficulty in interpreting the two sections of the IELRA).
58. Jenkins, supra note 10, at 487 (discussing representative certification under
the IPLRA); Malin supra note 18, at 112-14 (discussing representative certification
under the IELRA). For a further illustration of the differences between certification
under the IELRA and the IPLRA compare 5 ILCS 315/6 with 115 ILCS 5/7.
59. 115 ILCS 5/10(a) (emphasis added). The corresponding section of the IPLRA
is 5 ILCS 315/7.
60. Decatur Sch. Dist. No. 61, 4 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) 9 1076, 315, 320
(IELRB 1988).
61. 115 ILCS 5/4 (emphasis added). The corresponding section of the IPLRA is 5
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In Central City, the Illinois Supreme Court mandated a scope
of bargaining test which attempts to reconcile these two sections. However, the Central City test fails to give proper weight
to the limiting language depicted in Section 4 and fails to recognize that some subjects are the exclusive domain of the public. An
examination of how the boards interpret the two scope of bargaining sections is essential to understand how the Illinois Supreme
Court came to its decision in Central City.
C. A Historical Case Analysis: The Development of a Scope of
BargainingTest
The case analysis section of this Note focuses on the IELRB
decisions. These illustrations depict the historical attempts at
reconciling the corresponding sections of the two Illinois public
labor acts.6"
1. The IELRB'S First Examination into the Realm of Mandatory
Bargaining
Subsequent to the creation of the IELRB, the first significant
case to deal with the duty to bargain was Board of Education
Berkeley School District No. 87.64 In Berkeley, the Board of Education made what it thought was a "managerial" decision under
Section 4 by unilaterally implementing a change from an interscholastic athletic program to an intramural sports program.6 5
The Berkeley Educational Association asserted that this decision
required bargaining and brought the matter to an IELRB hearing
officer.66 The hearing officer determined that the decision was
permissive and not a subject of mandatory bargaining."
On appeal, the IELRB upheld the hearing officer's decision
that allowed the school district to forgo bargaining over its decision to change its athletics programs.66 In so holding, the IELRB
looked to the legislative history of the IELRA and recognized the

ILCS 315/4.
62. Central City Educ. Ass'n IEA-NEA v. IELRB, 599 N.E.2d 892, 905 (Ill.
1992).
63. This Note focuses on the IELRB's decisions because they are an excellent
example of how the scope of bargaining dilemma arose in Illinois. Furthermore, the
Illinois Supreme Court promulgated its scope of bargaining test from cases which
originated under the IELRB. Id. at 895. The Central City decision consolidated
appeals from the First and Fourth District Appellate Courts. Id.
64. 2 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) $ 1066, 171 (IELRB 1986).
65. Id. at 175.
66. Id. at 172.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 173.
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inherent contradiction of Section 10(a) and Section 4.69 In Berkeley, the IELRB created a test which classified subjects of bargaining as either "primarily" or "indirectly" related to the "hours, wages and terms and conditions of employment" as set forth in Section 4 of the IELRA.7 ° The majority in Berkeley avoided the interplay between Section 4 and Section 10 of the IELRA by holding
that the decision to switch programs "does not have wages, hours
and terms and conditions of employment as its primary subject
and only indirectly affects those matters."7 The Berkeley holding
illustrates the deliberate choice by the IELRB to avoid the contradiction of Section 4 and Section 10.
2. Addressing the Scope of BargainingIssue Directly:

District No. 59
The scope of bargaining issue was unavoidable in DistrictNo.
59 Educational Ass'n.72 The problem in District No. 59 required

the IELRB to directly address the conflict between Section 4 and
Section 10 of the IELRA.7 3 The issue before the IELRB in District No. 59 was whether the school district had a duty to collectively bargain over the formation and execution of a teacher evaluation process which the school code mandated.7 4 In holding
evaluation plans were subject to mandatory bargaining, the
IELRB devised a "continuum of decision making."7 5 The "continuum" plotted subjects regarding wages, hours and terms and
conditions of employment at one end of the continuum, and subjects involving managerial policy at the other.7 6 The IELRB then
69. Id. at 173-74. The IELRB recognized that some matters are arguably a matter of inherent managerial policy as set forth in Section 4 of the IELRA, yet still
involve the terms and conditions of employment as set forth in Section 10 of the
IELRA. Id.
70. Id. In Berkeley, the IELRB set forth its analysis as follows:
In our judgment, the interpretation of Section 4 most consistent with a reasoned attempt to relate each of the sentences and phrases of Section 4 to the
underlying purpose of the entire Section and to the legislative history is that
"policy matters directly affecting wages, hours and terms and conditions of
employment" are those policies that have wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment as their primary subject; clearly, decisions concerning
such policies are mandatory subjects of bargaining. However, the inherent
managerial policy decision involved here - a change in the nature of the
District's athletic program - does not have wages, hours and terms and
conditions of employment as its primary subject and only indirectly affects
those matters; thus it is not a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Id. at 176.
71. Id.
72. 3 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) 1094, 269 (IELRB 1987).
73. Id. at 272.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 273.
76. Id. at 272-73. In DistrictNo. 59 the Board stated:
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determined that subjects which fall closer to wages, hours and
terms and conditions of employment on the continuum are subject
to mandatory bargaining, while subjects which fall closer to the
core of managerial discretion are permissive and not subject to
bargaining.77 The IELRB applied this test and determined that
the development and implementation of the teacher evaluation
process fell closer to wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment on the continuum; therefore, the evaluation process was
subject to mandatory bargaining. 78 This "continuum" was the
first formal test developed by the IELRB to reconcile the contradictory sections of the IELRA.
3. Reconstruction and Adoption of a Formal Balancing Test

The next case before the IELRB dealing with the duty to
bargain was Decatur School Dist. No. 61 (Decatur 1).v9 In

Decatur I, the board examined whether the issue of class size was
subject to mandatory bargaining." The IELRB reviewed its decisions in Berkeley and DistrictNo. 59, and again wrestled with the
overlapping line between "hours, wages and terms and conditions
of employment" in Section 10 and "managerial policy" as set forth
in Section 4.81 Citing a need to accommodate management prerogatives with the duty to bargain, the IELRB devised a test utilizing both sections 4 and 10 of the IELRA. The Decatur I test
first looks to the complete wording of Section 4 to determine if the
issue involves a matter of "inherent managerial policy as set forth
in Section 4."82 The Decatur I test then looks to the complete

wording of Section 10 to determine whether the issue also concerns "terms and conditions of employment."8 3 If the IELRB de-

ITihere exists a continuum of decision making. At one end of the spectrum
are decisions which vitally and centrally concern wages, hours and terms
and conditions of employment. At the other are decisions which form the
core of management responsibilities and prerogatives. In each case, we must
examine where the decision fits on that continuum.

Id.
77. •Id. at 272.
78. Id. at 273.
79. 4 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) $ 1076, 315 (IELRB 1988).
80. Id. at 319.
81. Id. at 320 (comparing 115 ILCS 5/4 and 115 ILCS 10(a)).
82. See id. at 321 (stating that the entire wording of Section 4 of the IELRB
should be given consideration); 115 ILCS 5/4 (setting forth matters of inherent
managerial policy as the functions of the employer, standards of services, its overall budget, the organizational structure and selection of new employees and direction of employees).
83. DecaturSch. Dist. No. 61, 4 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) 9 1076, at 322-23
n.8 (differentiating a private labor sector test which focuses on managements "profit/cost motive" and "need to exercise unfettered entrepreneurial control" versus
public labor sector tests where costs do not serve as such a pivot point for the man-
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termines that both Section 10(a) and Section 4 are applicable to
the subject matter, the board applies a balancing test.84 In promulgating the Decatur I balancing test, the IELRB stated that:
[We must strike a balance between the educational employer's need
and right to establish and implement educational policy and the
interests of educational employees, expressed by their exclusive
representative, when such decisions affect employees wages, hours
and terms and conditions of employment.85
Using the Decatur I test, the IELRB held that class size is subject
to mandatory bargaining because it is a policy matter which "directly affects wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment within the meaning of Section 4."86
The Decatur Board appealed the Decatur I holding in Decatur
Board of Education District No. 61 v. IELRB 8 7 (Decatur II). In
Decatur H, the court recognized the difficulty in interpreting the
conflicting sections of the IELRA.5 5 Citing many factors,8 9 the

datory/permissive distinction).
84. Id. at 322.
85. Id. The IELRB noted that the balancing test adopted in DecaturI parallels
the approach followed by labor boards and courts in other states. Id. at 322 n.6.
Similar tests adopted by jurisdictions and cited in the IELRB's decision include:
National Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 512 P.2d 426, 431 (Kan. 1973) (weighing
impact on individual school teacher against effect on school system as a whole);
City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers' Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 394 (Me. 1973); Clark
County Sch. Dist. v. Local Gov't Employee Mgmt. Relations Bd., 530 P.2d 114, 119
(Nev. 1974); Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd.of Educ., 393 A.2d
278, 288 (N.J. 1978) (requiring bargaining on matters which affect the "work and
welfare" of the public employee and on "which negotiation would not significantly
interfere with managerial functions"); Sutherlin Educ. Ass'n v. Sutherlin Sch. Dist.
No. 130, 548 P.2d 208, 217 (Or. 1976); Pennsylvania Lab. Relations Bd. v. State
College Area Sch. Dist., 337 A.2d 262, 272 (Pa. 1975) (allowing the labor board to
weigh the impact of the particular issue as to terms and conditions of employment
against the effect on the basic policy of the system as a whole); City of Beloit v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 242 N.W.2d 231, 238 (Wis. 1976). See
id.
86. Decatur Sch. Dist. No. 61, 4 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) T 1076, 315, 322
(IELRB 1988).
87. 536 N.E.2d 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
88. Id. at 750. The court stated the dilemma as follows:
Section 10(a) and section 4 illustrate the conflicting interests considered at
the time of legislative enactment. In attempting to placate the conflicting
interests, something less than perfection resulted. Our responsibility is to
add some responsible and, hopefully, some understandable interpretation to
the seemingly conflicting statutory provisions.
Id.
89. Id. at 745-46 (conceding deference to the IELRB's interpretation of the
IELRA, Governor James Thompson's Amendatory Veto Message of the Act which
supports the balancing of employer and employee interests, the Pennsylvania Public Employee Relation Act which served as a guideline for the Illinois act, Pennsylvania court cases which have approved the use of a balancing test in State
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Appellate Court for the Fourth District of Illinois adopted the
Decatur I test and affirmed the IELRB's original decision that
class size is subject to mandatory bargaining.9" However, the
Decatur II court altered the test "subtly"9 by stating that it
would balance the competing interest only after finding the subject directly affects "wages, hours and terms and condition of
employment."9 2
As DecaturII made its way to the Appellate Court, two other
"duty to bargain" issues arose in Central City School District
94
13393 and LeRoy Community Unit School District.
These cases
required the IELRB to again make a determination whether the
issue at hand was subject to mandatory bargaining.9" When Central City and LeRoy were appealed, the Appellate Courts for the
First and Fourth District disagreed as to application of the
DecaturI test.
II.

THE EMERGENCE OF A UNIFIED TEST: THE EVOLUTION OF
CENTRAL CITY

A. The LeRoy Decisions
In LeRoy Community Unit School District96 (LeRoy I), the
LeRoy Educational Association (LEA), a representative of the

College, 337 A.2d at 271, and the Illinois State Labor Relations Board approved the
use of a balancing test in Cermak Health Services, 3 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP)
3030, 156, 156 (ILLRB 1987).
90. Decatur, 536 N.E.2d at 746 (holding that IELRB's balancing test is necessary to give proper interpretation to the statutory provisions of the IELRA and
that the 'considerable deference" standard used in Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441
U.S. 488, 494 (1979), which gave the National Labor Relations Board's decisions
'considerable deference" in making such determinations should apply to the
IELRB's determinations).
91. See Central City Educ. Ass'n IEA-NEA v. IELRB, 557 N.E.2d 418, 425 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990) (showing that the Appellate Court for the First District was the
first to term the Fourth District's change in the Decatur I as "subtle").
92. Decatur Bd. of Educ. Dist. No. 61 v. IELRB, 536 N.E.2d 743, 745 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1989).
93. 5 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) T 1056, 118 (IELRB 1989), rev'd sub. nom.,
Central City Educ. Ass'n IEA-NEA v. IELRB, 557 N.E.2d 418 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990),
modified, 599 N.E.2d 892 (Ill. 1992).
94. 5 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) 1131, 298 (IELRB 1989), rev'd sub. nom.,
Board of Educ., LeRoy Community Unit School Dist. No. 2 v. IELRB, 556 N.E.2d
857 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), modified, 599 N.E.2d 892 (Ill. 1992).
95. LeRoy, 5 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) 1 1131, at 298; Central City, 5 Pub.
Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) 9 1056, at 118.
96. For purposes of simplicity, this Note will number the LeRoy decisions as
they progressed through the appeals system. The IELRB's original decision will be
referred to as LeRoy I. The Appellate Courts decision in LeRoy will be referred to
as LeRoy I. Finally, consistent with the case name titles, the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision when it consolidated both the Leroy and Central City issues on
appeal will be called Central City III.
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certified personnel, requested School District 2 (District 2) to
bargain over the "decisions and effects" of teacher evaluation
programs which were a requirement under the School Code.97
District 2 maintained that the construction and -implementation of
the evaluation program was exempt from bargaining and it sought
only "input" from the LEA.9" The LEA filed unfair labor practice
charges with the IELRB alleging that District 2 failed to bargain
over a mandatory subject.9 9 In LeRoy I, the IELRB cited previous
decisions relating to evaluation plans and adopted the hearing
officer's finding that District 2's failure to bargain was an unfair
labor practice.1 ° °
On appeal in LeRoy Community Unit School District v.
IELRB' 01 (LeRoy H), the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth
District affirmed the IELRB's decision in part, reversed in part
and remanded the case to the IELRB. 112 In LeRoy H, the Appellate Court affirmed the DecaturH test, holding that the balancing
of interests occurs only after a showing that the issue has a direct
affect on the work force. ' 3 In applying the Decatur H test, the
LeRoy H court held that "substantive criteria of a teacher evaluation" are not subject to mandatory bargaining, while "mechanical
procedures involved in the evaluation process and remediation
The LEA and
plan" are subject to mandatory bargaining.'
IELRB filed petitions for leave to appeal.0 5 At the same time

97. LeRoy, 5 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) $ 1131, at 298.
98. Id. at 301.
99. Id. at 300.
100. Id. at 301. The IELRB cited to Mattoon Community Unit Sch. Dist, No. 2, 5
Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) $ 1199, 540 (IELRB 1988), and Community Consol.
1094, 269 (IELRB 1989), in
Sch. Dist. No. 59, 3 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP)
holding that the school district violated the IELRA by refusing to bargain with the
union over the development and implementation of a teacher evaluation plans
mandated by the school code. Id. Thus, the IELRB held that the evaluations were
a mandatory subject of bargaining. Id.
101. 556 N.E.2d 857 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
102. Id. at 873.
103. Id. at 866; see also Board of Regents of Regency Univ. v. IELRB, 560 N.E.2d
627 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (interpreting DecaturI the same way).
104. LeRoy, 556 N.E.2d at 867. The court provided:
First, the agency determines the factual question of whether the challenged
action involves a policy decision which has a direct or indirect impact on
wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment. If the management
policy has a direct effect on the work force, the agency must balance the
interests of management with the interests of the work force. Its determination of whose interests are more at risk is a question of law.
Id. at 856-57. The Appellate Court applied the Decatur H balancing test only after
it determined that the teacher evaluations had a direct affect on the work force. Id.
at 867.
105. Central City Educ. Ass'n IEA-NEA v. IELRB, 599 N.E.2d 892, 897 (Ill.
1992).
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the LeRoy issue was making its way through the Fourth Appellate
District, the Central City case made its way through the First
Appellate District.
B. The Central City Decisions
In Central City School District 13316 (Central City 1), the
School District notified its employees that it was contemplating a
RIF for the upcoming school year.10' The School District proceeded to dismiss four employees.' °8 The School District laid off
the employees because of fragile economic conditions in the School
District and declining enrollment."° Because the employee's union did not have an opportunity to collectively bargain the decision to lay off the teachers, the employee's union filed an unfair
labor charge with the IELRB. 110
On submitting briefs and arguments before the IELRB, the
IELRB in Central City applied the Decatur H test' and held
that an initial decision to impose a RIF is not a mandatory subject
of bargaining.1 1 2 On appeal in Central City School District 133

106. For purposes of simplicity, this Note will number the Central City decisions
as they progressed through the appeals system. The IELRB's original decision will
be referred to as Central City I. The Appellate Court's decision in Central City will
be referred to as Central City H. The Illinois Supreme Court's decision which was
consolidated with LeRoy will be referred to as Central City III. Finally, the Central
City case on remand from the Supreme Court will be referred to as Central City IV.
107. Central City, 599 N.E.2d at 895.
108. Id. at 895-96.
109. Id. at 896.
110. Id.
111. See Central City Sch. Dist. 133, 5 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) $ 1056,
118, 119 (IELRB 1989) (applying test set forth in DecaturI).
112. Id. at 121. The IELRA stated its reasoning as follows:
Fundamentally, therefore, the decision to [reduce in force] represents a
"basic educational policy choice." It is a decision not only about the overall
budget, but a decision about educational services as well. Where, as here,
the jobs are truly eliminated, the employees are not replaced and the work
is not transferred outside the unit, the decision represents a matter of basic
educational policy....
RIF decisions are inseparable from the District's responsibility and ability to determine its standards of services and overall budget. These responsibilities are close to the core of the educational employer's prerogative to
manage the educational system. Requiring collective bargaining over decisions to reduce the number of teachers would impinge heavily on
management's right and ability to make such basic educational policy decisions and choices. Consequently, we conclude that management's need to
freely determine educational policy outweighs the interests of employees in
bargaining over such decisions. ...
Our determination that RIF decisions are not subject to mandatory
collective bargaining comports with the overwhelming weight of authority
under other public sector labor laws. See, e.g., Schoolcraft College Ass'n of
Office PersonnelMESPA v. Schoolcraft Community College, 156 Mich. App.
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v. IELRB"' (Central City H), the Appellate Court of Illinois for
the First District reversed the IELRB's decision."" The Central
City H court cited the difference between the Decatur I and
Decatur H tests and concluded that the Decatur H court's interpretation of the Decatur I test "subtly, but significantly" altered
the analysis." 5 The Central City H court held that the Decatur I
test more accurately reflected the terms of the IELRA." 6 The
court in Central City H then adopted and applied the Decatur I
test and held that RIF orders are mandatory subjects of bargaining." 7 The School District filed a petition for leave to appeal." 8 This result left an inconsistency between the First and
Fourth District Appellate Court's interpretations of the Decatur I
test.
C. Consolidationand Adoption of a Formal Scope of
BargainingTest
Citing a need for the development of a standardized test, the
Illinois Supreme Court consolidated both the LeRoy H and the
Central City H cases on appeal in Central City v. IELRB (Central
City III)."1 The Central City III court recognized the difficulty
in reconciling the two sections of the IELRA and allowed various
amici 20 to file briefs for both the LeRoy evaluation program is-

754, 401 N.W.2d 915, 918-19 (1986); Old Bridge Township Bd. of Educ. v.
New Jersey Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 10 NJPER 15053 (N.J.
App. Div. 1984); City of Brookfield v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 87 Wis. 2d 804, 275 N.W.2d 723, 730 (1979); City of New Rochelle
v. New Rochelle Fed'n of Teachers, 4 PERB 3060 (N.Y. Public Employee
Relations Board 1971). These cases recognize that a RIF decision remains at
the core of management control and is not subject to mandatory bargaining,
even when the decision is for economic reasons.
Id.
113. 557 N.E.2d 418 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
114. See id. at 419 (reversing the IELRB's initial decision in Central City I and
holding that RIF orders are subject to mandatory bargaining).
115. Id. at 425. The Appellate Court held that balancing the competing interest
only after finding that the policy decision directly affects wages, hours and terms
and conditions of employment was not a proper reflection of the IELRA itself. Id.
Instead, the court held that it would balance the competing interests only after
determining that the subject was both an issue of "wages, hours, and terms and
conditions of employment" and a matter of educational policy. Id. at 424. The court
cited the need for this change because the Fourth District's interpretation "may
well tilt the balancing test toward management prerogatives, in contravention of
the [IELRA]." Id. at 425.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 427.
118. Central City Educ. Ass'n IEA-NEA v. IELRB, 599 N.E.2d 892, 897 (Ill.
1992).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 894 (allowing amicus curiae from Illinois Association of School Boards
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549

sue and the Central City RIF issue. 1 ' The Central City III court
then created a three-part test which expanded the scope of bar22
gaining in Illinois. 1
Analysis of the Central City III decision shows that the court
placed significant emphasis on the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act,12 Pennsylvania precedent and the legislative history of the IELRA.'24 Utilizing these sources, the Central City III court created a test for
analyzing whether a given issue is subject to mandatory bargaining. 125 The Central City III test mirrors the private sector test
that the United States Supreme Court set out for the NLRB's
use, 26 and provides:

in No. 70425, Illinois Community College Trustees Association in No. 70425, University of Illinois and Public Employer Labor Relations Association in No. 70425
Federation of Teachers in No. 70425, Illinois State Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations in No. 70425, Chicago Federal of Labor and Industrial Union Council in No. 70425, Illinois Federation of Teachers in Nos. 70584
& 70609 and Board of Education of School District No. 88, Du Page County in Nos.
70584 & 70609).
121. Id. at 897.
122. See id. at 905 (establishing three-part test).
123. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (giving the NLRB the power to regulate private sector
labor relations under the NLRA); see also Central City, 599 N.E.2d at 897 (citing
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 203, 217 (1964), which adopts
a benefits/burdens). See supra note 16 and accompanying text for discussion of the
Supreme Court's private sector benefits/burdens test.
124. Central City Educ. Ass'n IEA-NEA v. IELRB, 599 N.E.2d 892, 903-05 (Ill.
1992) (using Pennsylvania precedent and the legislative history of the IPLRA because of its similarity with the IELRA).
125. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court in Central City III provided:
The first part of the test requires a determination of whether the matter
is one of wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment. This is a
question that the IELRB is uniquely qualified to answer, given its experience and understanding of bargaining in education labor relations. If the
answer to this question is no, the inquiry ends and the employer is under no
duty to bargain.
If the answer the first question is yes, then the second question is
asked: Is the matter also one of inherent managerial authority? If the answer to the second question is no, then the analysis stops and the matter is
a mandatory subject of bargaining. If the answer is yes, then the hybrid
situation ... exists: the matter is within the inherent managerial authority
of the employer and it also affects wages, hours and terms and conditions of
employment.
At this point in the analysis, the IELRB should balance the benefits
that bargaining will have on the decisionmaking process with the burdens
that bargaining imposes on the employer's authority. Which issues are mandatory, and which are not, will be very fact-specific questions, which the
IELRB is eminently qualified to resolve.
Id. at 905 (reversing the Appellate Court in LeRoy H on other grounds, modifying
and remanding the Appellate Court in Central City II).
126. See supra note 16 discussing the benefits/burdens test promulgated by the
Supreme Court for the NLRB to use when making private sector scope of bargain-
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(1) Ask "whether the matter is one of wages, hours and terms
and conditions of employment[?]"12v If not,128"the inquiry ends and
the employer is under no duty to bargain."

(2) "If the answer to the first question is yes, "'129 ask "[i]s
the matter also one of inherent managerial authority?" 130 If not,
the inquiry
ends "and the matter is a mandatory subject of bar3
gaining."1 1

(3) If the answer to the second question is also yes, "the
IELRB should balance the benefits that bargaining will have on
the decisionmaking process with the32 burdens that bargaining
imposes on the employer's authority."
This test is unlike any prior ILLRB, ISLRB or IELRB
test. 33 Moreover, the Central City III test arguably reduces the
impact of the Section 4 "employers' rights" clause by overly simplifying a difficult step. 34 Instead of using the scope of bargaining
language in Section 4 regarding employers' rights, the Illinois
Supreme Court seemingly reduced those rights to matters of "inherent managerial policy." 13 Furthermore, the Central City III

decision illustrates the Supreme Court's misunderstanding of the
unique issues raised in public sector bargaining. 136 Under the

ing determinations.
127. Central City, 599 N.E.2d at 905.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See supra note 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of IELRB, ISLRB
and ILLRB tests used before the Central City III decision.
134. See Central City Educ. Ass'n IEA-NEA v. IELRB, 599 N.E.2d 892, 897 (Ill.
1992) (replacing the second part of the IELRB's and the Appellate Court's scope of
bargaining analysis which used the complete wording of Section 4 with "whether
the matter was one of inherent managerial authority"); Board of Educ., LeRoy
Community Unit School Dist. No. 2 v. IELRB, 556 N.E.2d 857, 864 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (holding that the Fourth Illinois Appellate Court specifically uses the complete wording of Section 4 in its analysis); Decatur Bd. of Educ. Dist. No. 61 v.
IELRB, 536 N.E.2d 743, 745 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that the First Illinois
Appellate Court specifically uses the complete wording of Section 4 in its analysis).
135. See Central City, 599 N.E.2d at 905 (holding that second part of test asks
only if matter was of "inherent managerial authority" and failing to cite any prior
IELRB, ILLRB or ISLRB decision which uses the complete wording of Section 4 in
its scope of bargaining analysis).
136. Id. at 910. This point is personified by Justice Miller's concurrence and dissent. Id. Justice Miller noted the lack of recognition the majority gave to the differences between public and private sector bargaining. Id. at 912. However, Justice
Miller believed that the Central City III test was practically identical to the
Decatur II test and that the RIF issue should not be remanded to the IELRB for a
rehearing using this "new" test. Id. However, if the Central City III test was identical to the Decatur II test, the IELRB should have found the same result. Compare Central City Sch. Dist. 133, 5 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) 1056, 118, 119
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Central City III test, a simple argument that a matter concerns
both wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment and
inherent managerial policy, invokes a benefits/burdens analysis.
By making the benefits/burdens analysis easy to attain, the Central City III test expands the scope of bargaining in the public
sector. This expansion fails to consider the special political and
economic characteristics of public sector bargaining. Moreover,
this failure effectively usurps the voting public's traditional role in
determining government policy. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded the Central City III
RIF issue to the IELRB with direc37
tions to use this new test.1
D. Central City III on Remand
On remand in Central City (Central City IV), the IELRB
reversed its original Central City I holding.'3 s Although the
IELRB's Central City I decision sided with the majority of states
in holding that RIF orders are not subject to mandatory bargaining, the IELRB had to readdress the RIF issue in Central City
V using the Illinois Supreme Court's Central City III test.' 39 In
applying the Central City III test, the IELRB held that a RIF is a
mandatory subject of bargaining because the benefits of bargaining over the issue outweigh the burdens it puts on
management. 4 ° The Supreme Court's test in Central City III is
now used by the three public labor relations boards (IELRB,
ISLRB and ILLRB) for all scope of bargaining issues.' The test
is a dangerous precedent for the public sector to follow because it

(IELRB 1989) (holding that RIF are not a mandatory subject of bargaining) with
Central City Sch. Dist. 133, 9 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) 9 1051, 162, 166
(IELRB 1993) (reversing its Central City I decision in holding that RIF were a
mandatory subject of bargaining). See infra notes 138-40 for a discussion of the
IELRB's ruling after the remand of Central City III.
137. Central City, 599 N.E.2d at 910.
138. Central City, 9 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) T 1051, at 168.
139. Id. at 165.
140. Id. The IELRB found that RIF orders are both a matter of wages, hours and
terms and conditions of employment and a matter of inherent managerial policy so
a balancing of the benefits that bargaining will have on the decision making process with the burdens that bargaining imposes on the employer's authority was
done according to Central City III. Id. Upon balancing these factors the IELRB determined that the benefits of bargaining outweighed the burdens. Id. Therefore,
RIF orders are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Id. at 168.
141. See, e.g., Teamsters Local Union No. 714, 9 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) T
3019, 116, 119 (ILLRB 1993) (using Central City III test to determine that newly
created investigator classification was not subject of mandatory bargaining); International Ass'n of Firefighters, 8 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) 912039, 213, 218
(ISLRB 1992) (using the Central City III test in holding no duty to bargain over
the content, format or the method of administering a job examination or calculating a rating score).
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fails to consider the unique aspects inherent in public sector bargaining.
III. THE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE SECTOR LABOR
RELATIONS: WHY CENTRAL CITY III WENT WRONG

Understanding the differences between public and private
sector bargaining is vital in developing an appropriate test for
determining the scope of mandatory bargaining in the public sector."" Although the NLRA and the Pennsylvania labor act were
used as models for the IELRA and the IPLRA, 14 the Central
City III court should not have simply adopted the benefits/burdens
analysis used in those jurisdictions. A private sector analysis is
not applicable to the public sector because of the unique economic
and political characteristics of public sector bargaining. Moreover,
the Central City III court's reliance on Pennsylvania precedent is
unfounded. When Pennsylvania courts order bargaining, the employer must only "meet and discuss" with employee representatives. However, when Illinois courts order bargaining, they require
the employer and employee representative to actually bargain in
good faith, rather than merely "meet and discuss." This additional
requirement in Illinois undermines the voting public's traditional
authority to determine how the government should spend its tax
dollars. In failing to consider the unique aspects of Illinois public
sector bargaining, the Central City III court promulgated a risky
precedent which significantly expands the Illinois public sector
employee's ability to bargain over, and ultimately affect, decisions
that are historically decided by the voting public.
First, this Part discusses why the Central City III court erred
in following the private sector benefits/burdens test by examining
the prevailing differences between private and public sector bargaining. Specifically, this Part analyzes the unique economic position of the public sector employee and how that position affects
traditional voter rights. Next, this Part analyzes why the Central
City III court's reliance on the Pennsylvania precedent is unjustified. Finally, this Part will illustrate how the failure of the Central City III test to consider these differences only disrupts the
bargaining process and expands the scope of bargaining in the
public sector; thus, matters of public policy are taken out of the
taxpayers' hands and placed in the hands of public employees.

142.
ing: A
143.
1992).

William Corbett, Determining the Scope of Public Sector Collective BargainNew Look via a Balancing Formula,40 MoNT. L. REV. 231, 253 (1979).
Central City Educ. Ass'n IEA-NEA v. IELRB, 599 N.E.2d 892, 900-01 (IIl.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text for discussion of how Illinois used

Pennsylvania's labor statute as a model for its statute.
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A. The Differences Between Private and Public Sector Bargaining
Although the Central City III court realized that differences
between public and private sector bargaining exist, it failed to
account for them in formulating the Central City III test.'" A
scope of bargaining test should weigh the economically advantageous position of the public sector employee against the potential
for their demands to affect public policy. 1" This section will discuss the economic and political factors involved in public sector
bargaining and how these factors relate to the scope of bargaining.
1. The Economic Differences Between Public and Private Sector
Bargaining
Economic motive is one significant difference between public
sector and private sector bargaining." In the private sector, an
employer's primary concerns are "bottom line" profits and costs
because they relate directly to the very existence of the organization. 147 In the public sector, the existence of the organization directly relates to taxes. 1 " Therefore, the public employer's primary focus is the quality of services rendered to the voting taxpayers.1 49 The contrast of these focal economic considerations creates the significant differences between bargaining in the private
and public sectors. 5 ' By failing to recognize this economic difference, the Central City III scope of bargaining test significantly
strengthened the public sector employee's position at the bargaining table.
The market forces that affect a given business directly impacts private sector bargaining."' Private sector market forces
include: industry position, current financial status and growth
prospectus.152 These forces create a threat of market-imposed

144. See Central City, 599 N.E.2d at 902 (noting that NLRB decisions are persuasive, but not binding, when determining a guideline for the scope of bargaining
in the private sector).
145. See infra note 204 for a discussion of other jurisdictions which have recognized the public's right to determine public policy in their scope of bargaining
tests.
146. June Miller Weisberger, The Appropriate Scope of Bargainingin the Public
Sector: The Continuing Controversy and the Wisconsin Experience, 1977 WIS. L.
REV. 685, 697.
147. Harry H. Wellington & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1116 (1969).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Corbett, supra note 142, at 254.
152. Id.
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unemployment and work to restrain union demands.' 5' If these
market forces are favorable to business, the private sector unions
are in a better position to demand additional benefits without the
threat of unemployment. 5 4 However, any fluctuation in these
market forces will drastically alter the demands and negotiations
between private sector unions and their employers. 5 '
On the other hand, the public sector employee is far less
156
concerned with unemployment as it relates to the market.
Generally, the services a governmental unit produces do not relate
to market price. 5 7 The relative monopoly by government of their
services produces a lack of product competition and the non-existence of a lower wage labor pool; thus, the economic constraints on
employees in public sector bargaining are less than in the private
sector. 158

The economic differences between public and private sector
bargaining places the public employee at an advantage over his
employer in bargaining situations. 159 Compared to private sector
employees, public sector employees have relatively no market
forces constraining them at the bargaining table. 6 ' As a result,
the public sector employee has an advantage over the private
sector employee in bargaining situations.' Therefore, a public
sector scope of bargaining test must make allowances for the ad162
vantageous economic position of the public sector employee.
153. Wellington & Winter, supra note 147, at 1117.
154. Id. at 1121.
155. Id. at 1117.
156. See Corbett, supra note 142, at 254 (discussing how all employee demands
in the private sector have an economic impact on the employer which constrain the
bargaining process).
157. Cf Wellington & Winter, supra note 147, at 1116.
158. Id. at 1117.
159. Corbett, supra note 142, at 255.
160. Weisberger, supra note 146, at 697. Professor Weisberger cites seven noted
characteristics which distinguish the public sector from the private sector. Id. at
694-99. These differences include the belief that the private sector model is inappropriate for the public sector because of the public employers role as the sovereign, the special element of public interest involved in public sector bargaining, the
statutory control over public sector bargaining, the lack of similar market controls
on public sector bargaining, the effects of compulsory binding interest arbitration
when the parties cannot reach an agreement through bargaining, the opportunity
for the public employee to use the political process to mandate their demands and
the large number of professionals engaged in public sector bargaining. Id.
161. See Corbett, supra note 142, at 256 (noting that the increased access and influence public employee organizations have over all other interest groups through
collective bargaining results in a "disproportionate amount of power").
162. Id. at 257. Professor Corbett states that the different economic concerns
which are prevalent in the public sector support the theory that "the private sector
experience in determining the scope of bargaining is not applicable." Id. One of the
reasons that the private sector experience is not very helpful is that "where economics [are] the operative constraint on bargaining, the scope of mandatory sub-
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Not only did the Central City III court fail to appraise the economic advantage enjoyed by the public sector employee, it also
failed to rationalize the potential political consequences of public
sector bargaining.
2. The Political ConsiderationsUnique to Public Sector
Bargaining
The process of governmental decisionmaking shapes employee
bargaining in the public sector.1" 3 Many times, public sector employees raise bargaining issues that are beyond their employers'
bargaining authority. 6 ' No longer is the issue a collective bargaining concern between the union and its employer, but rather,
the matter is a "political decision" for the voting public. 165 A
scope of bargaining test must recognize that these "political deci66
sions" require accountability from the public electoral body.'
The Central City III court failed to accommodate the interests of
the voting public when it broadened the scope of bargaining in the
Illinois public sector through 67the implementation of the private
sector's benefits/burdens test.
In a democratic government many different interest groups
use the political system to accomplish their goals."6 Interest

jects of bargaining can be broadly defined." Id. at 254.
163. Clyde W. Summers, Public Sector Bargaining:Problems of Governmental
Decisionmaking,44 U. CIN. L. REV. 669, 671-72 (1975). Bargaining with public employees undeniably includes political decisions in three senses. Id. at 672. First, it
involves policy choices which include the allocations of resources, the level of public
services and the obligations of the government. Id. Second, these policy choices
.are to be made by the political branches of government - by elected officials who
are politically responsible to the voters." Id. Finally, public sector bargaining is
intertwined with politics in the sense that the politically elected officials will cater
to the desires of the voting public in order to maximize votes. Id. See generally
Developments, supra note 18, at 1676-77 (noting political ramifications of public
sector bargaining); Lee C. Shaw & R. Theodore Clark, Jr., The PracticalDifferences
Between Public and Private Sector Collective Bargaining, 19 UCLA L. REV. 867,
1011-19 (1972) (discussing political aspects of public sector bargaining); Ralph
Summers, Public Sector Collective BargainingSubstantially Diminishes Democracy, 1 GOV'T UNION REV. 5, 11 (1980) (relating how political ramification of public
sector bargaining diminishes public involvement in public issues); Neal M. Davis,
Note, Scope of Collective Bargainingin Public Education: Toward a Comprehensive
Balancing Test, 36 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 107, 109 (1989) (discussing
political ramifications of public sector bargaining).
164. See Shaw & Clark, supra note 163, at 1012-13.
165. Id. at 1012.
166. Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining:A PoliticalPerspective, 83
YALE L.J. 1156, 1164 (1974).
167. See Developments, supra note 18, at 1681 (stating that "[w]hether the NLRA
model is emulated or rejected, however, the [public sector's] preoccupation with the
private sector system is unfortunate").
168. Corbett, supra note 142, at 255.
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groups effectuate their goals by manipulating government resources. ' 9 They utilize these resources through the opportunities afforded to them by the political process, including voting, lobbying
and finding representatives to hear their concerns.' v Public employees represent only one of the innumerable interest groups in
the political process, and the strength afforded to their concerns
depends on their ability to utilize the political process.'' Thus,
even without collective bargaining, public employees, as members
of the voting public, are given the ability to adequately influence
the terms and conditions of their employment.'72
However, the public employees' political influence becomes
foreboding because of their additional ability to demand collective
bargaining. 7 3 In effect, with collective bargaining, public employees can shape their terms and conditions of employment in
two ways. 174 First, as tax payers, public employees can effectuate change through the traditional political means of voting and
lobbying. Furthermore, under the current Central City III test,
these same public employees can also achieve their demands by
merely claiming that
an issue affects the terms and conditions of
175
their employment.
Sometimes, public employees' bargaining demands regarding
the terms and conditions of their employment reach a level which
warrants the concerns of the voting public. 7 1 Matters which
concern both the employees' working conditions and the public's
interest include the allocation of monetary resources and concerns
for police, fire, sanitation and medical services, as they relate to
public health and safety. 7 7 Without an appropriate scope of bargaining test, the introduction of collective bargaining in the public
sector will allow the demands of public employees to trump the
voting public's right to determine important community
interests. 7 s
169. Id.
170. Id. Before collective bargaining was introduced into the public sector, governmental decision making was a multilateral process involving many different
citizens and interest groups. Id.
171. Summers, supra note 166, at 1163.
172. Id. at 1160. Public employee groups can and normally do participate in
determining the terms and conditions of their employment through the political
process. Id. These groups can effectuate their goals by voting, supporting candidates, "organiz[ing] pressure groups, and present[ing] arguments in the public
forum." Id.
173. Id. at 1164.
174. Id.
175. See 5 ILCS 315/7 (setting forth the duty to bargain under the IPLRA); 115
ILCS 5/10 (setting forth the duty to bargain under the IELRA).
176. Developments, supra note 18, at 1681; Shaw & Clark, supra note 163, at
1012.
177. Shaw & Clark, supra note 163, at 1012-13.
178. See Corbett, supra note 142, at 257 (stating that "when a state [Public Em-
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In public sector collective bargaining, the government has a
dual role as an employer and a representative of the public interest.179 As a result, the government literally brings its policies to
the bargaining table."' By hiding under the guise "terms and
conditions of employment," public employees at the bargaining
table can affect decisions which are traditionally matters of public
concern."' When public employees demand, and receive, mandatory bargaining over issues which are arguably both public
concerns and related to the employees' terms and conditions of
employment, the voting public is deprived of their right to determine important government policy."12
A scope of bargaining test that is too broad allows public
employees to demand bargaining over issues which usurp public
rights.1 8 3 These bargaining discussions, in the form of collective
bargaining agreements, are essentially taken directly to the legislature with little opportunity for the public to express its concerns." If the bargaining agreement is subject to legislative approval, the political process may still represent the public's interest.18 ' However, public employee bargaining agreements command considerable deference in the legislative process.1 86 Therefore, collective bargaining agreements which concern public issues
8
divest the public of their right to determine those issues. 1
Although collective bargaining in the public sector has the
potential to deprive the voting public of their right to determine
public policy, it is not entirely without justification."8 Public

ployee Relation Boards] or court weighs competing employee or employer interests
in a particular bargaining topic, it should do so in light of the unique effect collective bargaining has on public sector decision making").
179. Id. at 254-55. The government, in its role as a public policy maker, must
consider all groups interests in the community. Id. at 255. Thus, when the government enters the bargaining process it must not only act in its capacity of an employer-manager, but also as a public policy maker. Id. Ultimately, the strength of
the government is not measured on how successfully it can accommodate a particular interest group, but, rather, if "it can successfully accommodate the interests of
the entire community ..... Id.
180. Summers, supra note 163, at 670. In public sector bargaining, the employer
is the government. Id. Therefore, "the employer's decisionmaking process becomes
of central concern in both legal and political terms." Id.
181. Id. at 671.
182. Id.
183. Developments, supra note 18, at 1683. When the scope of bargaining is expanded in public sector bargaining, it "alters the balance of political power and
arguably skews policymaking by favoring public employee unions in the allocation
of public resources." Id.
184. Summers, supra note 166, at 1159.
185. Id. at 1158.
186. Id. at 1164-65.
187. Corbett, supra note 142, at 256.
188. Summers, supra note 166, at 1167-68. Without collective bargaining in the
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employees must face the concerns of every other competing interest group vying for the same tax dollars.'89 Moreover, the voting
public always wants increased services and lower tax rates. 9 °
Collective bargaining in the public sector also facilitates the need
for a stable and dependable labor source in a monopolistic market
which supplies essential services to the public.' 9 ' However, the
allowance for unique aspects of public sector bargaining should
not permit employee demands to reach matters traditionally left
to the voting public.
3. How the Economic and PoliticalAspects of the Public Sector
Work Together
The unique political and economic characteristics involved in
public sector bargaining demand great consideration when setting
up guidelines for defining the scope of bargaining.9 2 The public
sector needs the process of collective bargaining because it facilitates labor relations in a monopolistic market.'9 3 However, the
lack of economic restraining forces in public sector bargaining
puts the public sector employee at a bargaining advantage. 94
The employees' economic advantages must be weighed along with
their ability to affect matters historically left to the voting public.
The Illinois Supreme Court, by ignoring these considerations in
developing the Central City III test, significantly broadened the
scope of public sector bargaining.'
The employees' expansive
bargaining power over the manner and means of governmental
services enables them to, in effect, change the very nature of a

public sector, public employees are at a unique disadvantage in the political bargaining process. Id. at 1167. The absence of collective bargaining in the public
sector "leaves public employees unable to protect their interests adequately against
those whose interests are opposed." Id. at 1168.
189. Id. at 1166. In public sector collective bargaining, the public sector employees "are not simply one group among many bargaining on the same basis." Id.
Rather, public sector employees' demands "run directly against the demands of
each others interest group." Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1167. The opposite of this affect, however, is that with a collective
bargaining procedure, when a powerful employee group bargains for and receives
benefits, that agreement becomes, in practice, a pattern for smaller bargaining
groups. Id. at 1174.
192. See Murray L. Sackman, Redefining the Scope of Bargainingin Public Employment, 19 B.C. L. REV. 155, 158 (1977) (discussing the differences between the
private and public sector and how those differences affect public sector bargaining).
193. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text for a discussion on the justification of public sector bargaining.
194. Corbett, supra note 142, at 255.
195. See Summers, supra note 166, at 1177-83 (discussing implications of the
political perspective with regard to specific subjects of bargaining).
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559

strip the public of
governmental service to fit their demands and
96
its right to make these basic policy decisions. 1
Herein lies the danger of the Central City III test. By making
a relatively simple argument that a matter concerns both the
terms and conditions of employment and involves matters of inherent managerial policy, the Central City III test expands the
scope of bargaining, by way of a benefits/burdens analysis, and
allows public sector employees' demands to usurp the rights of the
public to determine public issues.' 97 This precedent allows public sector employees' demands to take issues traditionally decided
through the political process, including the allocation of government resources and matters concerning public health and safety,
out of the voting public's hands and places them onto the bargaining table.
B.

Why Reliance on Pennsylvania Precedent is Unjustified

The Illinois Supreme Court unjustifiedly relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's adoption of a similar benefits/burdens
test to justify its creation of the Central City III test.'9 8 Illinois
fashioned its public sector labor acts after the Pennsylvania model; however, the parameters that define mandatory bargaining in
Illinois are different from Pennsylvania. If a matter is subject to
bargaining in Pennsylvania, the public sector labor act only requires the government to "meet and discuss" 9 with employee
representatives. °0 However, if a matter is subject to bargaining

196. See Developments, supra note 18, at 1683; see also Summers, supra note
166, at 1177-83.
197. See Developments, supra note 18, at 1683 (discussing how the expansion of
bargaining in the public sector allows public employees to affect public issues). In
Illinois, this point is personified by the Central City RIF issue. The IELRB initially
held that economically motivated RIF orders are not mandatory subjects of bargaining. See supra note 112 and accompanying text for a discussion on how the
Central City III decision "comports with the overwhelming weight of authority
under the public sector labor laws." However, on remand, using the Central City
III test, the IELRB held that economically motivated RIF orders were mandatory
subjects of bargaining. Central City Sch. Dist. 133, 9 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP)
1051, 162, 166 (IELRB 1993). See infra note 216 and accompanying text for a
discussion of other Board decisions that have reached the third step of the Central
City III test.
198. Central City Educ. Ass'n IEA-NEA v. IELRB, 599 N.E.2d 892, 900 (Ill.
1992) (stating that "the legislature used the Pennsylvania experience as a model in
creating the [IELRA], and the Pennsylvania courts' interpretation of the statute is
relevant to any analysis of the [IELRA]").
199. See supra note 20 and accompanying text for a discussion on the ramifications of the term "meet and discuss."
200. Central City, 599 N.E.2d at 900. In Central City III, even the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that the Pennsylvania statute only required that an employer "meet and discuss" with the employee representatives, while in Illinois the
parties must "bargain." Id.
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in Illinois, it requires mandatory good faith bargaining.20 ' Accordingly, if an Illinois employee group successfully argues that a
matter of public concern is subject to mandatory bargaining, that
group may impact decisions traditionally left to the voting public.2" 2 In light of these meeting requirement differences, Illinois
should not look to Pennsylvania precedent. Rather, in developing
a scope of bargaining test, Illinois should look to other jurisdictions which employ a similar "good faith bargaining" standard in
the public sector.
C. How Central City Went Wrong
The Central City III Court erroneously rationalized its adoption of a benefits/burdens test as a guideline to determine the
scope of bargaining in the Illinois public sector. As this Note explains, the adoption of the private sector benefits/burdens test
expands the scope of bargaining in Illinois and bolsters the already advantageous economic position of public sector employees.
In turn, this makes it easier for the public employee to demand
bargaining over subjects which should be decided through the
political process. Additionally, the Illinois Supreme Court erroneously based its decision on Pennsylvania precedent which uses a
"meet and discuss" standard for bargaining. Therefore, Illinois
must look to other jurisdictions for solutions in defining the scope
of bargaining.
IV. INCORPORATION OF THE UNIQUE PUBLIC SECTOR FACTORS
INTO A UNIFIED TEST

Many scholars and courts have proposed public sector scope
of bargaining solutions.0 3 Unlike the Central City III decision,

201. See supra note 46 for a discussion of good faith bargaining.
202. See supra note 20 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Pennsylvania statute differs from Illinois. In Pennsylvania, if a matter is subject to
mandatory bargaining the public sector employer is merely required to sit down
and talk about the ramifications of their actions with an employee representative.
However, in Illinois, the requirement of "bargaining" requires a collective bargaining agreement. See 5 ILCS 315/7 (setting forth the duty to bargain under the
IPLRA); 115 ILCS 5/10 (setting forth the duty to bargain under the IELRA). The
agreement, has an inside track to the legislature and, therefore, has the potential
to take away from the voting public's right to determine public policy. See supra
notes 183-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of how collective bargaining
in the public sector takes away the voting publics right to decide public policy.
203. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, Public SectorBargaining:Fiscal Crisis and Unilateral Change, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1221, 1234 (1985) (noting the need to recognize
the public's interest in determining public issues when deciding public sector scope
of bargaining issues); Jim Bowles, Defining the Scope of Bargaining for Teacher
Negotiations: A Study of JudicialApproaches, 29 LAB. L.J. 649, 655 (1978) (noting
that public interest must be considered when developing a scope of bargaining
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other courts facing the scope of bargaining dilemma recognize
address the unique problems that arise in the public sector
gaining process. °" The basic intention behind ratifying
IPLRA and the IELRA was to minimize employer-employee
ruptions. 2

'

and
barthe
dis-

However, the failure to set forth an appropriate

structure for the resolution of scope of bargaining problems "only
increases these disruptions."2" This Part examines relevant authority for developing scope of bargaining guidelines in Illinois.
Additionally, this Part discusses possible alternatives which will
protect the public's interest in determining public policy, while
still promoting equitable labor relations.
There are two ways by which Illinois could incorporate public
interest considerations into the Central City III test: (1) the imple-

mentation of a "laundry list" statute, or (2) the revision of the
current Central City III test.
A. "LaundryList" Statutes

Illinois can protect bargaining over matters of public policy
which are traditionally decided through the political process by
systematically delineating these specific subjects into Section 4.
This enactment would automatically render specific matters as
per se non-bargainable and would send a clear signal to the Illi-

test); Corbett, supra note 142, at 267 (suggesting that "the weight of the public
interest, together with any separate management interest of the public employer,
must be balanced against the interest of the employees to determine whether the
topic is mandatory or non-mandatory"); Davis, supra note 163, at 135 (suggesting
that adoption of a comprehensive balancing approach for the resolution of scope of
bargaining disputes which "weigh[s] the competing interests [in public sector bargaining] while avoiding unnecessary limitations to the scope of bargaining"); Gerry
Kaufman, Note, Scope of Negotiations and Teachers/ School District ContractsAfter
Rapid City Education Association v. Rapid City Area School District No. 51-4, 32
S.D. L. REV. 126, 126 (1987) (condoning adoption of the balancing test promulgated
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Local 195, IFPTE, AFL-CIO, 443 A.2d
187 (N.J. 1982)).
204. See, e.g., Local 195, 443 A.2d at 191-93 (holding that federal precedents concerning scope of bargaining in the private sector are of little value in determining
the permissible scope of negotiability in the public sector); Pennsylvania Lab. Relations Bd. v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 337 A.2d 262, 264-65 (Pa. 1975) (holding
that Public Employee Relations Act (PERA) should not be strictly interpreted in
light of NLRB decisions because the PERA concerns public employees while the
NLRA concerns private employees); West Bend Educ. Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 357 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Wis. 1984) (using balancing test
which incorporates the public's interest in the political process without relying on
private sector decisions).
205. See 5 ILCS 315/2 (stating that the purpose of the IPLRA is to provide peaceful and orderly procedures for the citizens of Illinois); see also 115 ILCS 5/1 (stating that the purpose of the IELRA is to promote orderly and constructive relationships between all educational employers and employees).
206. Corbett, supra note 142, at 253.
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nois Supreme Court that the legislature does not agree with the
Central City III test. "Laundry list" statutes enjoy moderate success in a number of states. °7
The Illinois legislature has already considered a bill, which
supplements Section 4 of the IELRA, to make RIF orders per se
non-bargainable. 0 5 In fact, the Illinois legislature recently
approved legislation that will make RIF orders per se non-bargainable in cities in excess of 500,000.209 However, systematical-

ly supplementing non-bargainable subjects into the Illinois public
sector labor acts will draw out the political process. Moreover,
"laundry list" statutes ostensibly nullify the collaborative efforts
inherent to collective bargaining by making certain subjects per se
non-bargainable.2 10
B. Revision and Adoption of a New Test

A practical way to incorporate the unique political and economic factors of public sector bargaining is to revise the Central
City III test. A number of other jurisdictions recognized these
distinct public sector characteristics and incorporated them into
their scope of bargaining tests.21 ' In In re Local 195, IFPTE,
207. Davis, supra note 163, at 112 n.27. California, Kansas, Iowa, Nevada and
Oregon have all adopted statutes which specifically list mandatory subjects of
bargaining in public sector employment. Davis, supra note 163, at 112 n.27. However, in San Mateo v. Public Employment Rel. Bd., 663 P.2d 523 (Cal. 1983), the
California Supreme Court interpreted their statute to allow bargaining over certain unenumerated items. Davis, supra note 163, at 112 n.27. Moreover, the Kansas Supreme Court, in Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501 v. Secretary of Kan. Dept. of
Human Resources, 685 P.2d 874 (Kan. 1984), also held that subjects "within the
purview" of its enumerated list statute were capable of being subject to mandatory
bargaining. Davis, supra note 163, at 115.
208. See, e.g., 1993 Ill. H.B. 3517, 88th Cong. (1994).
209. 1995 ILL. LEGIS SERV. P.A. 89-15 (H.B. 206) (West). Essentially, this
amendment only applies to the Chicago public school system and the Cook County
Community College.
210. See Bowles, supra note 203, at 653 (noting the inflexibility of list statutes
that give courts limited discretion to evolve the scope of bargaining along with the
changes in the work place).
211. See, e.g., San Mateo City Sch. Dist., 663 P.2d at 528 (applying a three-part
test which allows bargaining so long as the proposal does not "significantly abridge
the employers managerial prerogatives and fundamental policy decisions"); In re
Local 195, IFPTE, AFL-CIO, 443 A.2d 187, 191 (N.J. 1982) (applying three-part
test which holds that "matters of public policy are properly decided, not by negotiation and arbitration, but by the political process"); Rapid City Educ. Ass'n v. Rapid City Area Sch. Dist. No. 51-4, 376 N.W.2d 562, 564 (S.D. 1985) (citing the New
Jersey In re Local 195 three-part test in holding subjects to be negotiable "if it does
not significantly interfere with the exercise of inherent management prerogatives
pertaining to the determination of governmental policy"); West Bend Educ. Ass'n v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 357 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Wis. 1984) (applying statutory balancing test which considers the dual role of the public sector
employee as being in charge of "personnel and operations of a governmental unit,
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AFL-CIO,2 12 the New Jersey Supreme Court set forth an excellent example and frequently cited scope of bargaining test which
incorporates the distinct characteristics of public sector bargaining."' This three-part test provides:
First, a subject is negotiable only if it intimately and directly affect[s] the work and welfare of public employees....
Second, an item is not negotiable if it has been preempted by statute or regulation....

Third, a topic that affects the work and welfare of public employees
is negotiable only if it is a matter on which negotiated agreement
would not significantly interfere with the exercise of inherent management prerogatives pertainingto the determinationof governmental policy....
Although this test invariably considers the affects on an employees wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment, it also
recognizes government policy considerations.215 The In re Local
159 test mandates that if the subject overtly affects the
government's prerogative to determine policy, the matter is not
subject to mandatory bargaining, even if it intimately concerns
employees' working conditions.2 16
C. A Proposalfor Illinois
A combination of the In re Local 159 test with the IELRB's
previous Decatur I test and the Supreme Court's Central City III
test would result in a test that recognizes the unique political and
economic characteristics of public sector bargaining. The proposed
test would provide:
First, ask whether the matter is one of wages, hours and terms and
conditions of employment as set forth in Section 10. If not, the inquiry ends and the employer is under no duty to bargain.
Second, if the answer to the first question is yes, ask if the matter
is also one of managerial authority as set forth in Section 4. If not,

the inquiry ends and the matter is a mandatory subject of bargaining.

which is a political entity responsible for determining public policy and implementing the will of the people"). Even the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that
"the paramount concern must be the public interest in providing for an effective
and efficient performance of the public service in question," when it promulgated
its balancing test. Pennsylvania Lab. Relations Bd. v. State College, 337 A-2d 262,
268 (Pa. 1975).
212. 443 A.2d 187 (N.J. 1982).
213. Id. at 191-92. See generally Davis, supra note 163, at 127 (discussing aspects of New Jersey test); Kaufman, supra note 203, at 129 (discussing South
Dakota's adoption of the New Jersey test).
214. Local 195, 443 A.2d at 191-92 (emphasis added).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 193.
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Third, if the answer to the first two questions is yes, ask whether
the matter would significantly interfere with the exercise of inherent
management prerogativespertaining to the determination of governmental policy. If not, then the matter is subject to mandatory bargaining.
This test replaces the relatively useless benefits/burdens analysis
with a step that considers the unique role of the government as
an employer.2 17 Although this test will somewhat limit the scope
of bargaining in Illinois, it justifiably counters the public sector
employees' bargaining advantage by allowing the boards to determine what subjects are simply non-bargainable. This test allows
the boards to properly identify those non-bargainable matters that
218
Ultitraditionally fall within the purview of the voting public.
mately, this test effectuates the goal of collective bargaining,
which is to resolve disputes by allowing the parties to voice their
arguments.
CONCLUSION
Economic differences and political ramifications make public
sector bargaining distinct from private sector bargaining. Whether
Illinois uses the private sector or the Pennsylvania labor act as a
model for its public labor acts, the adoption of the private sector
2 9
The pribenefits/burdens scope of bargaining test is ill-fated.
vate sector bargaining test used in the public sector fails to account for the economic advantages the public sector employee

217. Board decisions using the Central City III test illustrate how useless the
third step benefits/burdens analysis is. Almost every time an employee's demand is
successfully argued to the third-step of the analysis the benefits of bargaining are
determined to outweigh the burdens bargaining will impose on management. See,
e.g., Licensed Practical Nurses Ass'n of Ill., Div. 1, 10 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill.
(LRP) 3009, 35, 39 (ILLRB 1994) (applying third part of Central City III test to
determine that drug testing is subject to mandatory bargaining); Oak Park
Firefighters Ass'n, 9 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) $ 2019, 92, 97 (ISLRB 1992)
(applying third step of Central City III test to determine that the benefits of bargaining over the proposed qualification changes on the conditions of employment
outweighs the burdens bargaining would impose on management); International
Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1526, 8 Pub. Employee Rep. Ill. (LRP) $ 2039, 213, 215
(ISLRB 1992) (using the third step of the Central City III test to determine that
the benefits of bargaining over examination evaluations of the firefighters outweighed the burdens bargaining imposed on management), affd sub. nom., Village
of Franklin Park v. ISLRB, 638 N.E.2d 1144 (111. App. Ct. 1994). Thus, no matter
how much a matter is of public concern, if an employee demand is successfully
argued as concerning both a term and condition of employment and an inherent
managerial policy, the matter will be subject to mandatory bargaining. See supra
note 140 for a discussion of how the benefits/burdens analysis affected the Central
City RIF issue.
218. In re Local 195, IFPTE, AFL-CIO, 443 A.2d 187, 191 (N.J. 1982).
219. Developments, supra note 18, at 1654.
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enjoys and the adverse political ramifications collective bargaining
imposes on the public sector. The allowance for the unique aspects
of public sector bargaining into a working test will fulfill the goal
of collective bargaining, while still maintaining a proper balance
of influence among competing interest groups as to political issues.
Eric C. Scheiner

